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Abstract. Given two elliptic curves over a finite field having the same cardinality and en-
domorphism ring, it is known that the curves admit an isogeny between them, but finding
such an isogeny is believed to be computationally difficult. The fastest known classical al-
gorithm takes exponential time, and prior to our work no faster quantum algorithm was
known. Recently, public-key cryptosystems based on the presumed hardness of this problem
have been proposed as candidates for post-quantum cryptography. In this paper, we give a
subexponential-time quantum algorithm for constructing isogenies, assuming the Generalized
Riemann Hypothesis (but with no other assumptions). Our algorithm is based on a reduction
to a hidden shift problem, together with a new subexponential-time algorithm for evaluating
isogenies from kernel ideals (under only GRH), and represents the first nontrivial application
of Kuperberg’s quantum algorithm for the hidden shift problem. This result suggests that
isogeny-based cryptosystems may be uncompetitive with more mainstream quantum-resistant
cryptosystems such as lattice-based cryptosystems.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of constructing an isogeny between two given isogenous ordinary elliptic
curves defined over a finite field Fq and having the same endomorphism ring. (Two such curves are
called horizontally isogenous.) This problem has led to several applications in elliptic curve cryp-
tography, both constructive and destructive. The fastest known probabilistic algorithm for solving
this problem is the algorithm of Galbraith and Stolbunov [18], based on the work of Galbraith,
Hess, and Smart [17]. Their algorithm is exponential, with a worst-case (and average-case) running
time roughly proportional to 4
√
q.
Although quantum attacks are known against several cryptographic protocols of an algebraic
nature [12, 19, 34], until now there has been no nontrivial quantum algorithm for constructing
isogenies. The difficulty of this problem has led to various constructions of public-key cryptosystems
based on finding isogenies, beginning with a proposal of Couveignes [10]. More recently, Rostovtsev
and Stolbunov [29] and Stolbunov [36] proposed refined versions of these cryptosystems with the
specific aim of obtaining cryptographic protocols that resist attacks by quantum computers.
In this work, we give a subexponential-time quantum algorithm for constructing an isogeny
between two given horizontally isogenous elliptic curves, and show that the running time of our
algorithm is bounded above by Lq(
1
2 ,
√
3
2 ) under (only) the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis (GRH).
This result raises serious questions about the viability of isogeny-based cryptosystems in the context
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of quantum computers. At present, isogeny-based cryptosystems are not especially attractive since
their performance is poor compared to other quantum-resistant cryptosystems, such as lattice-
based cryptography [20]. Nevertheless, they represent a distinct family of cryptosystems worthy
of analysis (for reasons of diversity if nothing else, given the small number of quantum-resistant
public-key cryptosystem families available [27]). Since isogeny-based cryptosystems already perform
poorly at moderate security levels [36, Table 1], any improved attacks such as ours would seem to
disqualify such systems from consideration in a post-quantum world.
1.1 Contributions
Our first main contribution, described in Section 5, is a reduction from the problem of isogeny
construction to the abelian hidden shift problem. While a connection between isogenies and hidden
shifts was noted previously by Stolbunov [36], we observe that the reduction gives an injective hidden
shift problem. This allows us to apply an algorithm of Kuperberg [25] to solve the hidden shift
problem using a subexponential number of queries to certain functions. This reduction constitutes
the first nontrivial application of Kuperberg’s algorithm outside of the black-box setting.
The reduction to the hidden shift problem alone does not immediately give a subexponential-
time algorithm for computing isogenies, because one must consider the time required to compute the
hiding functions. Indeed, prior to our work there was no known subexponential-time algorithm to
evaluate these functions. Our second main contribution, described in Section 4, is a subexponential-
time (classical) algorithm to compute the isogeny star operator, which is defined as a certain action
of an ideal class group on a set of elliptic curves. In this way we can compute the hiding functions in
subexponential time and thus obtain a subexponential-time reduction to the hidden shift problem.
Unlike previous algorithms for isogeny computation [16, 17, 23], our runtime analysis assumes only
GRH, whereas all previous subexponential-time algorithms for isogeny problems have required
additional heuristic assumptions. We achieve this improvement using expansion properties of a
certain Cayley graph [22]. The same idea can also be used to obtain subexponential algorithms
(under only GRH) for evaluating isogenies (see Remark 4.9). In addition, Bisson [4] has shown
that our method yields a subexponential algorithm for computing endomorphism rings of ordinary
elliptic curves under GRH.
Kuperberg’s algorithm for the abelian hidden shift problem uses superpolynomial space (i.e., a
quantum computer with superpolynomially many qubits), so the same is true of the most straight-
forward version of our algorithm. Since it is difficult to build quantum computers with many qubits,
this feature could limit the applicability of our result. However, we also obtain an algorithm using
polynomial space by taking advantage of an alternative approach to the abelian hidden shift prob-
lem due to Regev [28]. Regev only explicitly considered the case of the hidden shift problem in a
cyclic group whose order is a power of 2, and even in that case did not compute the constant in
the exponent of the running time. We fill both of these gaps in our work, showing that the hidden
shift problem in any finite abelian group A can be solved in time L|A|(12 ,
√
2) by a quantum com-
puter using only polynomial space. Consequently, we give a polynomial-space quantum algorithm
for isogeny construction using time Lq(
1
2 ,
√
3
2 +
√
2). The group relevant to isogeny construction is
not always cyclic, so the extension to general abelian groups is necessary for our application.
1.2 Related work
Our algorithm for evaluating the isogeny star operator is based on reducing an ideal modulo prin-
cipal ideals to obtain a smooth ideal. This idea is originally due to Galbraith, Hess, and Smart [17].
Constructing elliptic curve isogenies in quantum subexponential time 3
Bro¨ker, Charles, and Lauter [7] and Jao and Soukharev [23] also use this idea to give algorithms
for evaluating isogenies. Bisson and Sutherland [5] use a similar smoothing technique to compute
endomorphism rings in subexponential time. We stress that, with the exception of [7], which is re-
stricted in scope to small discriminants, all the results mentioned above make heuristic assumptions
of varying severity [5, §4][17, p. 37][23, p. 224] in addition to the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis
in the course of proving their respective runtime claims. Our work is the first to achieve provably
subexponential running time with no heuristic assumptions other than GRH. In practice, the heuris-
tic algorithms in [5] and [23] run slightly faster than our algorithms in Section 4, because they make
use of an optimized exponent distribution (originating from [5]) that minimizes the number of large
degree isogenies appearing in the smooth factorization. Our work does not use this optimization,
because doing so would reintroduce the need for additional heuristic assumptions.
An alternative approach to computing isogenies, given in Couveignes [10, p. 11] and Stol-
bunov [36, p. 227], is to treat the class group as a Z-module and use lattice basis reduction to
compute the isogeny star operator. In practice, the lattice-based approach works well for moder-
ate parameter sizes. However, since it amounts to solving the closest vector problem, the method
asymptotically requires exponential time (even with known quantum algorithms), and thus is slower
than our approach.
2 Isogenies
For general background on elliptic curves, we refer the reader to Silverman [35].
Let E and E′ be elliptic curves defined over a field F . An isogeny φ : E → E′ is an algebraic
morphism satisfying φ(∞) = ∞. The degree of an isogeny is its degree as an algebraic map. The
endomorphism ring End(E) is the set of isogenies from E(F¯ ) to itself. This set forms a ring under
pointwise addition and composition.
When F is a finite field, the rank of End(E) as a Z-module is either 2 or 4. We say E is
supersingular if the rank is 4, and ordinary otherwise. A supersingular curve cannot be isogenous to
an ordinary curve. Most elliptic curves are ordinary (in particular, supersingular curves have density
zero [32]), and most current proposals for isogeny-based cryptography (including all published
isogeny-based public-key cryptosystems) use ordinary curves. Thus, in this paper we restrict our
attention to ordinary elliptic curves. It remains an interesting open problem to study cryptographic
applications of isogenies between supersingular curves and to better understand the computational
difficulty of computing such isogenies, but we do not address this issue.
Over a finite field Fq, two elliptic curves E and E
′ are isogenous if and only if #E(Fq) =
#E′(Fq) [37]. The endomorphism ring of an ordinary elliptic curve over a finite field is an imaginary
quadratic order O∆ of discriminant ∆ < 0. The set of all isomorphism classes (over F¯q) of isogenous
curves with endomorphism ring O∆ is denoted Ellq,n(O∆), where n is the cardinality of any such
curve. We represent elements of Ellq,n(O∆) by taking the j-invariant of any representative curve in
the isomorphism class.
An isogeny between two curves having the same endomorphism ring is called a horizontal
isogeny [15]. Likewise, we say that two isogenous curves are horizontally isogenous if their endomor-
phism rings are equal. Any separable horizontal isogeny φ : E → E′ between curves in Ellq,n(O∆)
can be specified, up to isomorphism, by giving E and kerφ [35, III.4.12]. The kernel of an isogeny,
in turn, can be represented as an ideal in O∆ [39, Thm. 4.5]. Denote by φb : E → Eb the isogeny
corresponding to an ideal b (keeping in mind that φb is only defined up to isomorphism of Eb).
Principal ideals correspond to isomorphisms, so any other ideal equivalent to b in the ideal class
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group Cl(O∆) of O∆ induces the same isogeny, up to isomorphism [39, Thm. 3.11]. Hence one
obtains a well-defined group action
∗ : Cl(O∆)× Ellq,n(O∆)→ Ellq,n(O∆)
[b] ∗ j(E) = j(Eb)
where [b] denotes the ideal class of b. This group action, which we call the isogeny star operator, is
free and transitive [39, Thm. 4.5], and thus Ellq,n(O∆) forms a principal homogeneous space over
Cl(O∆).
Isogeny graphs under GRH
Our runtime analysis in Section 4 relies on the following result of [22] which states, roughly, that ran-
dom short products of small primes in Cl(O∆) yield nearly uniformly random elements of Cl(O∆),
under GRH.
Theorem 2.1. Let O∆ be an imaginary quadratic order of discriminant ∆ < 0 and conductor c.
Set G = Cl(O∆). Let B and x be real numbers satisfying B > 2 and x ≥ (ln |∆|)B . Let Sx be the
multiset A ∪ A−1 where
A = {[p] ∈ G : gcd(c, p) = 1 and N(p) ≤ x is prime}
with N(p) denoting the norm of p. Then, assuming GRH, there exists a positive absolute constant
C > 1, depending only on B, such that for all ∆, a random walk of length
t ≥ C ln |G|
ln ln |∆|
in the Cayley graph Cay(G,Sx) from any starting vertex lands in any fixed subset S ⊂ G with
probability at least 12
|S|
|G| .
Proof. Apply Corollary 1.3 of [22] with the parameters
– K = the field of fractions of O∆
– G = Cl(O∆)
– q = |∆|.
Following [11], we refer to G = Cl(O∆) as the ring class group of ∆. Observe that by Remark 1.2(a)
of [22], Corollary 1.3 of [22] applies to the ring class group G, since ring class groups are quotients of
narrow ray class groups [11, p. 160]. By Corollary 1.3 of [22], Theorem 2.1 holds for all sufficiently
large values of |∆|, i.e., for all but finitely many |∆|. To prove the theorem for all |∆|, simply take
a larger (but still finite) value of C.
Corollary 2.2 Theorem 2.1 still holds with the set A redefined as
A = {[p] ∈ G : gcd(m∆, p) = 1 and N(p) ≤ x is prime}
where m is any integer having at most O(x1/2−ε log |∆|) prime divisors.
Proof. The alternative definition of the set A differs from the original definition by no more than
O(x1/2−ε log |∆|) primes. As stated in [22, p. 1497], the contribution of these primes can be absorbed
into the error term O(x1/2 log(x) log(xq)), and hence does not affect the conclusion of the theorem.
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3 The group action inverse problem
For a fixed discriminant ∆, the vectorization [10, §2] or group action inverse [36, §2.4] problem is
the problem of finding an ideal class [b] ∈ Cl(O∆) such that [b] ∗ j(E) = j(E′), given j(E) and
j(E′). We refer to [b] as the quotient of j(E) and j(E′). The computational infeasibility of finding
quotients in Ellq,n(O∆) is a necessary condition for the security of isogeny-based cryptosystems [10,
§3][36, §7]. In the remainder of this paper, we present our subexponential algorithm for evaluating
quotients in Ellq,n(O∆) on a quantum computer.
A notable property of isogeny-based cryptosystems is that they do not require the ability to
evaluate the isogeny star operator efficiently on arbitrary inputs. It is enough to sample from random
smooth ideals (for which ∗ can be evaluated efficiently) when performing operations such as key
generation [10, §5.4][36, §6.2]. However, to attack these cryptosystems using our approach, we do
require the ability to evaluate the isogeny star operator on arbitrary inputs. We turn to this problem
in the next section.
4 Computing the isogeny star operator
In this section, we describe a new classical (i.e., non-quantum) algorithm to evaluate the isogeny
star operator. All notation is as in Section 2. Given an ideal class [b] in Cl(O∆), and a j-invariant
E of an ordinary elliptic curve of endomorphism ring O∆ over Fq, we wish to evaluate [b] ∗ j(E).
We define
LN (
1
2 , c) := exp[(c+ o(1))
√
lnN ln lnN ].
For convenience, we denote Lmax{|∆|,q}(12 , c) by L(c).
In Section 4.1 we show that, under GRH, our algorithm has a running time of Lq(
1
2 ,
√
3
2 ), which is
subexponential in the input size. For clarity, we present our algorithms and analysis in full instead of
as “patches” to existing work. We emphasize that the basic structure of these algorithms appeared
in prior work; our main contribution is to the analysis, which is facilitated by small changes to
the algorithms. Specifically, Algorithm 1 is based on [23, Algorithm 3], which is in turn based on
Seysen’s algorithm [33]; Algorithm 2 is based on [7, Algorithm 4.1]. Our bounds on t in Algorithm 1
are new, and allow us to prove the crucial runtime bound (Proposition 4.3).
Computing a relation. Given an ideal class [b] ∈ Cl(O∆), Algorithm 1 produces a relation vector
z = (z1, . . . , zf ) ∈ Zf for [b], with respect to a factor base F = {p1, . . . , pf}, satisfying [b] = Fz :=
pz11 · · · pzff , with the additional property (cf. Proposition 4.5) that the L1-norm |z|1 of z is less than
O(ln |∆|) for some absolute implied constant (here the L1 norm of a vector denotes the sum of the
absolute values of its coordinates). Algorithm 1 is similar to Algorithm 11.2 in [8], except that we
impose a constraint on |v|1 in Step 5 in order to keep |z|1 small, and (for performance reasons)
we use Bernstein’s algorithm instead of trial division to find smooth elements. We remark that
Corollary 9.3.12 of [8] together with the restriction C > 1 in Theorem 2.1 implies that there exists
a value of t satisfying the inequality in Algorithm 1.
Computing j(E′). Algorithm 2 is the main algorithm for evaluating the isogeny star operator.
It takes as input a discriminant ∆ < 0, an ideal class [b] ∈ Cl(O∆), and a j-invariant j(E) ∈
Ellq,n(O∆), and produces the element j(E′) ∈ Ellq,n(O∆) such that [b] ∗ j(E) = j(E′). Eliminating
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Algorithm 1 Computing a relation
Input: ∆, q, n, z, [b], and an integer t satisfying C ln |Cl(O∆)|
ln ln |∆|
≤ t ≤ C ln |∆| where C is the constant of
Theorem 2.1/Corollary 2.2
Output: A relation vector z ∈ Zf such that [b] = [Fz], or nil
1: Compute a factor base consisting of split primes; discard any primes dividing qn to obtain a new factor
base F = {p1, p2, . . . , pf}
2: Set S ← ∅, P ← {N(p) : p ∈ F}
3: Set ℓ← L( 1
4z
)
4: for i = 0 to ℓ do
5: Select v ∈ Zf0..|∆|−1 uniformly at random subject to the condition that |v|1 = t
6: Calculate the reduced ideal av in the ideal class [b] · [Fv]
7: Set S ← S ∪N(av)
8: end for
9: Using Bernstein’s algorithm [3], find a P-smooth element N(av) ∈ S (if one exists), or else return nil
10: Find the prime factorization of the integer N(av)
11: Using Theorem 3.1 of Seysen [33] on the prime factorization of N(av), factor the ideal av over F to
obtain av = Fa for some a ∈ Zf
12: Return z = a− v
Algorithm 2 Computing j(E′)
Input: ∆, q, [b], and a j-invariant j(E) ∈ Ellq,n(O∆)
Output: The element j(E′) ∈ Ellq,n(O∆) such that [b] ∗ j(E) = j(E′)
1: Using Algorithm 1 with any valid choice of t, compute a relation z ∈ Zf such that [b] = [Fz] =
[pz11 p
z2
2 · · · p
zf
f ]
2: Compute a sequence of isogenies (φ1, . . . , φs) such that the composition φc : E → Ec of the sequence
has kernel E[pz11 p
z2
2 · · · pzff ], using the method of [7, §3]
3: Return j(Ec)
the primes dividing qn is necessary for the computation of the isogenies in the final step of the
algorithm.
Algorithm 2 is correct since the ideals b and Fz belong to the same ideal class, and thus act
identically on Ellq,n(O∆).
4.1 Runtime analysis
Here we determine the theoretical running time of Algorithm 2, as well as the optimal value of
the parameter z in Algorithm 1. As is typical for subexponential-time factorization algorithms
involving a factor base, these two quantities depend on each other, and hence both are calculated
simultaneously.
Proposition 4.1 The running time of Algorithm 1 is at most L(z) + L( 14z ), assuming GRH.
Proof. Step 1 of Algorithm 1 takes time L(z) [8, Lemmas 11.3.1 and 11.3.2]. Step 2 of the algorithm
requires L(z) norm computations. Step 3 is negligible. Step 6 requires C ln |∆| multiplications in
the class group, each of which requires O((ln |∆|)1+ε) bit operations [30]. Hence the for loop in
Steps 4–8 has running time L( 14z ) ·O((ln |∆|)2+ε). Bernstein’s algorithm [3] in Step 9 has a running
Constructing elliptic curve isogenies in quantum subexponential time 7
time of b(log2 b)
2+ε where b = L(z) + L( 14z ) is the combined size of S and P . Finding the prime
factorization in Step 10 costs L(z) using trial division, and Seysen’s algorithm [33, Thm. 3.1] in
Step 11 has negligible cost under ERH (and hence GRH). Accordingly, we find that the running
time is
L(z) +O((ln |∆|)2+ε) · L( 14z ) + b(log2 b)2+ε + L(z) = L(z) + L( 14z ),
as desired.
Remark 4.2. If we use quantum algorithms, then the performance boost obtained from Bernstein’s
algorithm is not necessary, since quantum computers can factor integers in polynomial time [34].
This allows for some simplification in Algorithm 1 in the quantum setting: there is no need to store
elements of S (since one can test directly for smooth integers via factoring), and the algorithm no
longer requires superpolynomial space.
Proposition 4.3 Under GRH, the probability that a single iteration of the for loop of Algorithm 1
produces an F-smooth ideal av is at least L(− 14z ).
Proof. We adopt the notation used in Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 2.2. Apply Corollary 2.2 with the
values m = qn, B = 3, and x = f = L(z)≫ (ln |∆|)B. Observe that m has at most O(log q) prime
divisors, and
O(log q)≪ Lq(12 , z(12 − ε)) ≤ L(z(12 − ε)) = x1/2−ε.
Therefore Corollary 2.2 applies. The ideal class [b] · [Fv] is equal to the ideal class obtained by
taking the walk of length t in the Cayley graph Cay(G,Sx), having initial vertex [b], and whose
edges correspond to the nonzero coordinates of the vector v. Hence a random choice of vector v
under the constraints of Algorithm 1 yields the same probability distribution as a random walk in
Cay(G,Sx) starting from [b].
Let S be the set of reduced ideals in G with L(z)-smooth norm. By [8, Lemma 11.4.4], |S| ≥√
|∆|L|∆|(12 ,− 14z ) ≥
√
|∆|L(− 14z ). Hence, by Corollary 2.2, the probability that av lies in S is at
least
1
2
|S|
|G| ≥
1
2
·
√
|∆|
|G| · L(−
1
4z ).
Finally, Theorem 9.3.11 of [8] states that
√
|∆|
|G| ≥ 1ln |∆| . Hence the probability that av is F -smooth
is at least
1
2
· 1
ln |∆| · L(−
1
4z ) = L(− 14z ),
as desired.
Corollary 4.4 Under GRH, Algorithm 1 succeeds with probability at least 1− 1e .
Proof. Algorithm 1 loops through ℓ = L( 14z ) vectors v, and by Proposition 4.3, each such choice
of v has an independent 1/ℓ chance of producing a smooth ideal av. Therefore the probability of
success is at least 1− (1− 1ℓ )ℓ > 1− 1e as claimed.
The following proposition shows that the relation vector z produced by Algorithm 1 is guaranteed
to have small coefficients.
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Proposition 4.5 Any vector z output by Algorithm 1 satisfies |z|1 < (C + 1) ln |∆|.
Proof. Since z = a − v, we have |z|1 ≤ |a|1 + |v|1. But |v|1 ≤ C ln |∆| by construction, and the
norm of av is less than
√
|∆|/3 [8, Prop. 9.1.7], so
|a|1 < log2
√
|∆|/3 < log2
√
|∆| < ln |∆|.
This completes the proof.
Finally, we analyze the running time of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 4.6. Under GRH, Algorithm 2 succeeds with probability at least 1− 1e and runs in time
at most
L( 14z ) + max{L(3z), L(z)(ln q)3+ε}.
Proof. We have shown that Algorithm 1 has running time L(z) +L( 14z ) and success probability at
least 1 − 1e . Assuming that it succeeds, the computation of the individual isogenies φi in Step 2 of
Algorithm 2 proceeds in one of two ways, depending on whether the characteristic of Fq is large [7,
§3.1][17, §3] or small [7, §3.2]. The large characteristic algorithm fails when the characteristic is
small, whereas the small characteristic algorithm succeeds in all situations, but is slightly slower in
large characteristic. For simplicity, we consider only the latter, and more general, algorithm.
The general algorithm proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we compute the kernel polynomial
of the isogeny. The time to perform one such calculation is O((ℓ(ln q)max(ℓ, ln q)2)1+ε) in all cases
([26, Thm. 1] for characteristic ≥ 5 and [14, Thm. 1] for characteristic 2 or 3). In the second step,
we compute the equation of the isogenous curve using Ve´lu’s formulae [38]. This second step has a
running time of O(ℓ2+ε(ln q)1+ε) [21, p. 214]. Hence the running time of Step 2 is at most
|z|1(O((ℓ(ln q)max(ℓ, ln q)2)1+ε) +O(ℓ2+ε(ln q)1+ε)).
By Proposition 4.5, this expression is at most
(C + 1)(ln |∆|)(max{L(3z), L(z)(ln q)3+ε}+ L(2z)(ln q)1+ε)
= max{L(3z), L(z)(ln q)3+ε}.
The theorem follows.
Corollary 4.7 Under GRH, Algorithm 2 has a worst-case running time of at most Lq(
1
2 ,
√
3
2 ).
Proof. Using the inequality |∆| ≤ 4q, we may rewrite Theorem 4.6 in terms of q. We obtain the
following upper bound for the running time:
L( 14z ) + max{L(3z), L(z)(lnq)3+ε} ≤ Lq(12 , 14z + 3z).
The optimal choice of z = 1
2
√
3
yields the running time bound of Lq(
1
2 ,
√
3
2 ).
Remark 4.8. Using our technique for eliminating heuristics, Bisson [4] has recently developed a
subexponential-time algorithm for determining endomorphism rings of elliptic curves, assuming
only GRH. As part of that work, Bisson presents a faster algorithm [4, Prop. 4.4] for determining
the curves appearing in the sequence of isogenies in Step 2 of Algorithm 2, with running time
quadratic in the isogeny degrees, improving upon the cubic time required in prior algorithms. Using
this algorithm, the running time of Algorithm 2 improves to Lq(
1
2 ,
1√
2
).
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Remark 4.9. Our algorithm for computing the isogeny star operator readily extends to an algorithm
for evaluating isogenies in subexponential time. As in [7, 23], we specify an isogeny φ : E → E′ by
providing the ideal b ⊂ End(E) = O∆ corresponding to the kernel of φ. To distinguish between
isogenies that are identical up to isomorphism, we define a normalized isogeny [6, 7] to be one where
φ∗(wE′) = wE . Algorithm 2 applied to the input b yields an (unnormalized) isogeny φc : E →
Ec isomorphic to the desired isogeny φ. To find the normalized isogeny, we must evaluate the
necessary isomorphism explicitly. This can be easily done by using [23, Algorithm 3, Steps 20–23]
in conjunction with [7, Algorithm 4.1, Steps 4–6] on the relation produced by Algorithm 1. These
additional steps are not rate-limiting, so the running time of the algorithm is unchanged. Bisson’s
improvement (Remark 4.8) does not apply here, since we need to evaluate the actual isogeny, rather
than just find the isogenous curve.
5 A quantum algorithm for constructing isogenies
Our quantum algorithm for constructing isogenies uses a simple reduction to the abelian hidden shift
problem. To define this problem, let A be a known finite abelian group (with the group operation
written multiplicatively) and let f0, f1 : A → S be black-box functions, where S is a known finite
set. We say that f0, f1 hide a shift s ∈ A if f0 is injective and f1(x) = f0(xs) (i.e., f1 is a shifted
version of f0). The goal of the hidden shift problem is to determine s using queries to such black-box
functions. Note that this problem is equivalent to the hidden subgroup problem in the A-dihedral
group, the nonabelian group A⋊ Z2 where Z2 acts on A by inversion.
Isogeny construction is easily reduced to the hidden shift problem using the group action defined
in Section 2. Given horizontally isogenous curves E0, E1 with endomorphism ring O∆, we define
functions f0, f1 : Cl(O∆)→ Ellq,n(O∆) that hide [s] ∈ Cl(O∆), where [s] is the ideal class such that
[s] ∗ j(E0) = j(E1). Specifically, let fc([b]) = [b] ∗ j(Ec). Then it is immediate that f0, f1 hide [s]:
Lemma 5.1. The function f0 is injective and f1([b]) = f0([b][s]).
Proof. Since ∗ is a group action,
f1([b]) = [b] ∗ j(E1)
= [b] ∗ ([s] ∗ j(E0))
= ([b][s]) ∗ j(E0)
= f0([b][s]).
If there are distinct ideal classes [b], [b′] such that f0([b]) = f0([b′]), then [b] ∗ j(E0) = [b′] ∗ j(E0),
which contradicts the fact that the action is free and transitive [39, Thm. 4.5]. Thus f0 is injective.
Note that a similar connection between isogenies and hidden shift problems was described in [36,
Section 7.2]. However, that paper did not recognize the significance of the reduction, and in partic-
ular did not appreciate the role played by injectivity. Without the assumption that f0 is injective,
the hidden shift problem can be as hard as the search problem, and hence requires exponentially
many queries [2] (although for non-injective functions f0 with appropriate structure, such as the
Legendre symbol, the non-injective hidden shift problem can be solved by a quantum computer
in polynomial time [12]). On the other hand, injectivity implies that the problem has polynomial
quantum query complexity [13], allowing for the possibility of faster quantum algorithms.
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This reduction allows us to apply quantum algorithms for the hidden shift problem to construct
isogenies. The (injective) hidden shift problem can be solved in quantum subexponential time
assuming we can evaluate the group action in subexponential time. The latter is possible due to
Algorithm 2.
We consider two different approaches to solving the hidden shift problem in subexponential time
on a quantum computer. The first, due to Kuperberg [25], has a faster running time but requires
superpolynomial space. The second approach generalizes an algorithm of Regev [28]. It uses only
polynomial space, but is slower than Kuperberg’s original algorithm.
Method 1: Kuperberg’s algorithm. Kuperberg’s approach to the abelian hidden shift problem is
based on the idea of performing a Clebsch-Gordan sieve on coset states. The following appears as
Theorem 7.1 of [25].
Theorem 5.1. The abelian hidden shift problem has a [quantum] algorithm with time and query
complexity 2O(
√
n), where n is the length of the output, uniformly for all finitely generated abelian
groups.
In our context, 2O(
√
n) = 2O(
√
ln |∆|) since |Cl(O∆)| = O(
√
∆ ln∆) [8, Theorem 9.3.11]. Further-
more, 2O(
√
ln |∆|) = L(o(1)) = L(0) regardless of the value of the implied constant in the exponent,
since the exponent on the left has no
√
ln ln |∆| term, whereas L(0) does. As mentioned above,
Kuperberg’s algorithm also requires superpolynomial space (specifically, it uses 2O(
√
n) qubits).
Method 2: Regev’s algorithm. Regev [28] showed that a variant of Kuperberg’s sieve leads to a
slightly slower algorithm using only polynomial space. In particular, he proved Theorem 5.2 below
in the case where A is a cyclic group whose order is a power of 2 (without giving an explicit value
for the constant in the exponent). Theorem 5.2 generalizes Regev’s algorithm to arbitrary finite
abelian groups. A detailed proof of Theorem 5.2 appears in the Appendix (see Theorem A.1).
Theorem 5.2. Let A be a finite abelian group and let functions f0, f1 hide some unknown s ∈ A.
Then there is a quantum algorithm that finds s with time and query complexity L|A|(12 ,
√
2) using
space poly(log |A|).
We now return to the original problem of constructing isogenies. Note that to use the hidden shift
approach, the group structure of Cl(O∆) must be known. Given ∆, it is straightforward to compute
Cl(O∆) using existing quantum algorithms (see the proof of Theorem 5.4). Thus, we assume for
simplicity that the discriminant ∆ is given as part of the input. This requirement poses no difficulty,
since all existing proposals for isogeny-based public-key cryptosystems [10, 29, 36] stipulate that O∆
is a maximal order, in which case its discriminant can be computed easily: simply calculate the trace
t(E) of the curve using Schoof’s algorithm [31], and factor t(E)2 − 4q to obtain the fundamental
discriminant ∆ (note of course that factoring is easy on a quantum computer [34]).
Remark 5.3. One can conceivably imagine a situation where one is asked to construct an isogeny
between two given isogenous curves of unknown but identical endomorphism ring. Although we
are not aware of any cryptographic applications of this scenario, it presents no essential difficulty.
Bisson [4] has shown using Corollary 2.2 that the discriminant∆ of an elliptic curve can be computed
in Lq(
1
2 ,
1√
2
) time under only GRH (assuming that factoring is easy).
Constructing elliptic curve isogenies in quantum subexponential time 11
Algorithm 3 Isogeny construction
Input: A finite field Fq, a discriminant ∆ < 0, and Weierstrass equations of horizontally isogenous elliptic
curves E0, E1
Output: [s] ∈ Cl(O∆) such that [s] ∗ j(E0) = j(E1)
1: Decompose Cl(O∆) = 〈[b1]〉 ⊕ · · · ⊕ 〈[bk]〉 where |〈[bj ]〉| = nj
2: Solve the hidden shift problem defined by functions f0, f1 : Zn1 × · · · × Znk → Ellq,n(O∆) satisfying
fc(x1, . . . , xk) = ([b1]
x1 · · · [bk]xk ) ∗ j(Ec), giving some (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ Zn1 × · · · × Znk
3: Output [s] = [b1]
s1 · · · [bk]sk
Assuming ∆ is known, we decompose Cl(O∆) as a direct sum of cyclic groups, with a known
generator for each, and then solve the hidden shift problem. The overall procedure is described in
Algorithm 3.
Theorem 5.4. Assuming GRH, Algorithm 3 runs in time Lq(
1
2 ,
√
3
2 ) (respectively, Lq(
1
2 ,
√
3
2 +
√
2))
using Theorem 5.1 (respectively, Theorem 5.2) to solve the hidden shift problem.
Proof. We perform Step 1 using [9, Algorithm 10], which determines the structure of an abelian
group given a generating set and a unique representation for the group elements. We represent
the elements uniquely using reduced quadratic forms, and we use the fact that, under ERH (and
hence GRH), the set of ideal classes of norm at most 6 ln2 |∆| forms a generating set [1, p. 376].
By Theorem 5.1 (resp. Theorem 5.2), Step 2 uses L(o(1)) = L(0) (resp. L(
√
2)) evaluations of the
functions fi. By Corollary 4.7, these functions can be evaluated in time Lq(
1
2 ,
√
3
2 ) using Algorithm 2,
assuming GRH. Overall, Step 2 takes time Lq(
1
2 ,
√
3
2 + o(1)) = Lq(
1
2 ,
√
3
2 ) if Theorem 5.1 is used, or
Lq(
1
2 ,
√
3
2 +
√
2) if Theorem 5.2 is used. The cost of Step 3 is negligible.
Remark 5.5. Using the improved algorithm for evaluating the isogeny star operator described in
Remark 4.8, the running time of Algorithm 3 is improved to Lq(
1
2 ,
1√
2
+ o(1)) = Lq(
1
2 ,
1√
2
) using
Theorem 5.1 to solve the hidden shift problem (requiring superpolynomial space), and to Lq(
1
2 ,
1√
2
+√
2) = Lq(
1
2 ,
3√
2
) using Theorem 5.2 (requiring only polynomial space).
Remark 5.6. The running time of the algorithm is ultimately limited by two factors: the best known
quantum algorithm for the hidden shift problem runs in superpolynomial time, and the same holds
for the best known (classical or quantum) algorithm for computing the isogeny star operator.
Improving only one of these results to take polynomial time would still result in a superpolynomial-
time algorithm.
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A Subexponential-time and polynomial-space quantum algorithm for
the general abelian hidden shift problem
Following Kuperberg’s discovery of a subexponential-time quantum algorithm for the hidden shift
problem in any finite abelian group A [25], Regev presented a modification of Kuperberg’s algorithm
that requires only polynomial space, with a slight increase in the running time [28]. However, Regev
only explicitly considered the case A = Z2n , and while he showed that the running time is L|A|(12 , c),
he did not determine the value of the constant c.
In this appendix we describe a polynomial-space quantum algorithm for the general abelian
hidden shift problem using time L|A|(12 ,
√
2). We use several of the same techniques employed by
Kuperberg [25, Algorithm 5.1 and Theorem 7.1] to go beyond the case A = Z2n , adapted to work
with a Regev-style sieve that only uses polynomial space.
Let A = ZN1 × · · · × ZNt be a finite abelian group. Consider the hidden shift problem with
hidden shift s = (s1, . . . , st) ∈ A. By Fourier sampling, one (coherent) evaluation of the hiding
functions f0, f1 can produce the state
|ψx〉 := 1√
2
(
|0〉+ exp
[
2πi
(
s1x1
N1
+ · · ·+ stxt
Nt
)]
|1〉
)
(ψ)
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with a known value x = (x1, . . . , xt) ∈R A (see for example the proof of Theorem 7.1 in [25]), where
x ∈R A denotes that x occurs uniformly at random from A. For simplicity, we begin by considering
the case where A = ZN is cyclic. Then Fourier sampling produces states
|ψx〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ ωsx|1〉)
where x ∈R ZN is known and ω := e2πi/N .
If we could make states |ψx〉 with chosen values of x, then we could determine s. In particular,
the following observation is attributed to Peter Høyer in [25]:
Lemma A.1. Given one copy each of the states |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, |ψ4〉, . . . , |ψ2k−1〉, where 2k = Ω(N),
one can reconstruct s in polynomial time with probability Ω(1).
Proof. We have
k−1⊗
j=0
|ψ2j 〉 =
1√
2k
2k−1∑
y=0
ωsy|y〉.
Apply the inverse quantum Fourier transform over ZN (which runs in poly(logN) time [24]) and
measure in the computational basis. The Fourier transform of |s〉, namely 1√
N
∑N−1
y=0 ω
sy|s〉, has
overlap squared with this state of 2k/N , which implies the claim.
We aim to produce states of the form |ψ2j 〉 using a sieve that combines states to prepare new
ones with more desirable labels. A basic building block is Algorithm 4, which can be used to produce
states with smaller labels.
Lemma A.2. Algorithm 4 runs in time 2k poly(logN) and succeeds with probability Ω(1) provided
4k ≤ B/B′ ≤ 2k/k.
Proof. The running time is dominated by the brute force calculation in Step 6 and the projection
in Step 10, both of which can be performed in time 2k poly(logN).
The probability of aborting in Step 2 for any one xi is 1 − 2B′B ⌊ B2B′ ⌋ ≤ 2B
′
B , so by the union
bound, the overall probability of aborting in this step is at most k 2B
′
B ≤ 1/2. Conditioned on not
aborting in Step 2, xi ∈R {0, 1, . . . , 2B′⌊B/2B′⌋ − 1}.
Let x · yj = q(2B′) + rj where 0 ≤ rj < 2B′ (q is the measurement outcome, which is
independent of j). By the uniformity of the xis, each r
j = x · yj mod 2B′ is uniformly dis-
tributed over {0, 1, . . . , 2B′ − 1}. Thus the output label is x′ = x · (y ⋆− y⋆) = |r ⋆− r⋆| where
r⋆, r
⋆∈R {0, 1, . . . , 2B′ − 1}. A simple calculation shows that the distribution of |r ⋆− r⋆| is
Pr(|r ⋆− r⋆| = ∆) =
{
1
2B′ for ∆ = 0
2B′−∆
2B′2 for ∆ ∈ {1, . . . , 2B′ − 1}.
Thus the probability that we abort in Steps 12–16 is 1/2, and conditioned on not aborting in these
steps, x′ ∈R {0, 1, . . . , B′ − 1}. Thus the algorithm is correct if it reaches Step 17.
It remains to show that the algorithm succeeds with constant probability. We have already
bounded the probability that we abort in Step 2 and Steps 12–16. Since y = 0 occurs with probability
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Algorithm 4 Combining states to give smaller labels
Input: Parameters B,B′ and states |ψx1〉, . . . , |ψxk 〉 with known x1, . . . , xk ∈R {0, 1, . . . , B − 1}
Output: State |ψx′〉 with known x′ ∈R {0, 1, . . . , B′ − 1}
1: if ∃i : xi ≥ 2B′⌊B/2B′⌋ then
2: Abort
3: end if
4: Introduce an ancilla register and compute
1√
2k
∑
y∈{0,1}k
ωs(x·y)|y〉|⌊(x · y)/2B′⌋〉
where x · y :=∑ki=1 xiyi
5: Measure the ancilla register, giving an outcome q and a state
1√
ν
ν∑
j=1
ωs(x·y
j)|yj〉
where y1, . . . , yν 6= 0k are the k-bit strings such that ⌊(x · yj)/2B′⌋ = q
6: Compute y1, . . . , yν by brute force
7: if ν = 1 then
8: Abort
9: end if
10: Project onto span{|y1〉, |y2〉} or span{|y3〉, |y4〉} or . . . or span{|y2⌊ν/2⌋−1〉, |y2⌊ν/2⌋〉}, giving an outcome
span{|y⋆〉, |y ⋆〉}
11: Let x′ = x · (y ⋆− y⋆) where x · y ⋆≥ x · y⋆ WLOG
12: if x′ ∈ {1, . . . , B′ − 1} then
13: Abort with probability B′/(2B′ − x′)
14: else if x′ ∈ {B′, . . . , 2B′ − 1} then
15: Abort
16: end if
17: Relabel |y⋆〉 7→ |0〉 and |y ⋆〉 7→ |1〉, giving a state |ψx′〉
2−k and at most one state |yν〉 can be unpaired (and this only happens when ν is odd), the projection
in Step 10 fails with probability at most ν−1 + 2−k ≤ 1/3 + o(1). We claim that the probability
of aborting in Step 8 (i.e., the probability that ν = 1) is also bounded away from 1. Call a value
of q bad if ν = 1. Since 0 ≤ x · y ≤ k(B − 1), there are at most kB/2B′ possible values of q, and
in particular, there can be at most kB/2B′ bad values of q. Since the probability of any particular
bad q is 1/2k, the probability that q is bad is at most kB/B′2k+1 ≤ 1/2. This completes the proof.
We apply this combination procedure using the generalized sieve of Algorithm 5, which is equiv-
alent to Regev’s “pipeline of routines” [28].
Lemma A.3. Suppose me−2k = o(1). Then Algorithm 5 is correct, succeeds with probability 1−o(1)
using k(1+o(1))m state preparations and combination operations, and uses space O(mk).
Proof. If Algorithm 5 outputs a state from Sm then it is correct. Since the algorithm never stores
more than O(mk) states at a time, it uses space O(mk). It remains to show that the algorithm is
likely to succeed using only k(1+o(1))m state preparations and combination operations.
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Algorithm 5 Sieving quantum states
Input: Procedures to prepare states from a set S0 and to combine k states from Si−1 to make a state from
Si with probability at least p for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m}
Output: State from Sm
1: repeat
2: while for all i we have fewer than k states from Si do
3: Make a state from S0
4: end while
5: Combine k states from some Si to make a state from Si+1 with probability at least p
6: until there is a state from Sm
If we could perform combinations deterministically, we would need
1 state from Sm,
k states from Sm−1,
k2 states from Sm−2,
...
km states from S0.
Since the combinations only succeed with probability p, we lower bound the probability of eventually
producing (2k/p)m−i states from Si for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} (so in particular, we produce one state
from Sm). Given (2k/p)
m−i+1 states from Si−1, the expected number of successful combinations
is p(2k/p)m−i+1/k = 2(2k/p)m−i, whereas only (2k/p)m−i successful combinations are needed. By
the Chernoff bound, the probability of having fewer than (2k/p)m−i successful combinations is at
most e−p(2k/p)
m−i
. Thus, by the union bound, the probability that the algorithm fails is at most
m−1∑
i=1
e−p(2k/p)
m−i ≤ me−2k,
so the probability of success is 1− o(1).
Finally, the number of states from S0 is (2k/p)
m = k(1+o(1))m and the total number of combi-
nations is
∑m−1
i=0 (2k/p)
m−i/k = k(1+o(1))m.
When using the sieve, we have the freedom to choose the relationship between k and m to
optimize the running time. Suppose that mk = (1 + o(1)) log2N (intuitively, to cancel log2N bits
of the label), and also suppose that the combination operation takes time 2k poly(logN) (as in
Lemma A.2). Then if we take k = c
√
log2N log2 log2N , we find that the overall running time
of Algorithm 5 is 2k2(1+o(1))m log2 k poly(logN) = LN (
1
2 , c +
1
2c ). Choosing c =
1√
2
gives the best
running time, LN (
1
2 ,
√
2).
We now consider how to apply the sieve. To use Lemma A.1, our goal is to prepare states of the
form |ψ2j 〉 for each j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊log2N⌋}. First we show how to prepare the state |ψ1〉 in time
LN(
1
2 ,
√
2) using Algorithm 4 as the combination procedure in Algorithm 5. For i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m},
the ith stage of the sieve produces states with labels from Si = {0, 1, . . . , Bi − 1}. Lemma A.4
below shows that there is a choice of the Bi with B0 = N , Bm = 2, and successive ratios of the
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Bis satisfying the conditions of Lemma A.2, such that 2
kk(1+o(1))m = LN (
1
2 ,
√
2). It then follows
that Algorithm 5 produces a uniformly random label from Sm = {0, 1} with constant probability
in time LN(
1
2 ,
√
2), and in particular, can be used to produce a copy of |ψ1〉 in time LN (12 ,
√
2).
Lemma A.4. There is a constant N0 such that for all N > N0, letting Bi = ⌊N/ρi⌋ where ρ =
(N/2)1/m and
k =
⌊√
1
2 log2N log2 log2N
⌋
m =
⌈
log2N/2
k − log2 2k
⌉
= Θ
(√
log2N
log2 log2N
)
,
we have B0 = N , Bm = 2, and 4k ≤ Bi−1/Bi ≤ 2k/k for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof. Clearly B0 = N , and the value of ρ is chosen so that Bm = 2.
For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we have
Bi−1
Bi
=
⌊N/ρi−1⌋
⌊N/ρi⌋ ≤
N/ρi−1
N/ρi − 1 =
ρ
1− ρi/N .
Since ρi/N ≤ ρm/N = 1/2, we have Bi−1/Bi ≤ 2ρ. Then using
ρ ≤ (N/2)
k−log2 2k
log2 N/2 =
2k
2k
gives Bi−1/Bi ≤ 2k/k as claimed.
Similarly, we have
Bi−1
Bi
=
⌊N/ρi−1⌋
⌊N/ρi⌋ ≥
N/ρi−1 − 1
N/ρi
= ρ− ρi/N ≥ ρ− 12 .
Since
ρ = (N/2)Θ(
√
log2 log2 N/ log2 N) = 2Θ(
√
log2 N log2 log2 N) = 2Θ(k),
we have ρ− 12 ≥ 4k for sufficiently large N . This completes the proof.
If N is odd, then division by 2 is an automorphism of ZN . Thus we can prepare |ψ2j 〉 by
performing the above sieve under the automorphism x 7→ 2−jx. It follows that the abelian hidden
shift problem in a cyclic group of odd order N can be solved in time LN(
1
2 ,
√
2).
Now suppose that N = 2n is a power of 2. In this case, we first use a combination procedure
that zeros out low-order bits, as described in Algorithm 6. We use the notation xS := {xz : z ∈ S}
for any x ∈ Z and S ⊂ Z.
Lemma A.5. Algorithm 6 runs in time 2k poly(logN) and succeeds with probability Ω(1) provided
k ≥ ℓ′ − ℓ+ 1.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma A.2. Again the running time is dominated by the
brute force calculation in Step 3 and the projection in Step 7, both of which can be performed in
time 2k poly(logN).
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Algorithm 6 Combining states to cancel low-order bits
Input: Parameters ℓ, ℓ′ and states |ψx1〉, . . . , |ψxk〉 with known x1, . . . , xk ∈R 2ℓ{0, 1, . . . , N/2ℓ − 1}
Output: State |ψx′〉 with known x′ ∈R 2ℓ
′{0, 1, . . . , N/2ℓ′ − 1}
1: Introduce an ancilla register and compute
1√
2k
∑
y∈{0,1}k
ωs(x·y)|y〉|x · y mod 2ℓ′〉
2: Measure the ancilla register, giving an outcome r and a state
1√
ν
ν∑
j=1
ωs(x·y
j)|yj〉
where y1, . . . , yν 6= 0k are the k-bit strings such that x · yj mod 2ℓ′ = r
3: Compute y1, . . . , yν by brute force
4: if ν = 1 then
5: Abort
6: end if
7: Project onto span{|y1〉, |y2〉} or span{|y3〉, |y4〉} or . . . or span{|y2⌊ν/2⌋−1〉, |y2⌊ν/2⌋〉}, giving an outcome
span{|y⋆〉, |y ⋆〉}
8: Relabel |y⋆〉 7→ |0〉 and |y ⋆〉 7→ |1〉, giving a state |ψx′〉 with x′ = x · (y
⋆− y⋆) mod N
We claim that the algorithm is correct if it reaches Step 8. Observe that x ·yj mod N = qj2ℓ′+r
where r is independent of j. Since yj 6= 0k, x · yj mod N ∈R 2ℓ{0, 1, . . . , N/2ℓ − 1}, so qj ∈R
{0, 1, . . . , N/2ℓ′ − 1}, and hence x′ = (q ⋆− q⋆)2ℓ′ mod N ∈R 2ℓ′{0, 1, . . . , N/2ℓ′ − 1} as required.
The projection in Step 7 fails with probability at most 1/3 + o(1). It remains to show that the
algorithm reaches Step 7 with probability Ω(1), i.e., to upper bound the probability that ν = 1.
Call a value of r bad if ν = 1. There are 2ℓ
′−ℓ possible values of r, so in particular there are at most
2ℓ
′−ℓ bad values of r. Since the probability of any particular bad r is 1/2k, the probability that r
is bad is at most 2ℓ
′−ℓ−k ≤ 1/2. This completes the proof.
Algorithm 6 is similar to the combination procedure used in [28], but differs in that the latter
requires ν = O(1), which is established in the analysis using a second moment argument. The
modification of pairing as many values of y as possible allows us to use a simpler analysis (with
essentially the same performance).
To produce a state of the form |ψ2j 〉, we first use Algorithm 6 to cancel low-order bits and then
use Algorithm 4 to cancel high-order bits. Note that if all states |ψx〉 have labels x with a common
factor—say, 2j |x—then we can view the labels as elements of Z2n−j and apply Algorithm 4 to affect
the n − j most significant bits. Specifically, to make the state |ψ2j 〉, we apply Algorithm 5 using
Algorithm 6 as the combination procedure that produces states from Si using states from Si−1
for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m1 + 1}, and Algorithm 4 (on the n − j most significant bits) as the combination
procedure for i ∈ {m1 + 2, . . . ,m1 +m2 + 1}, taking
Si =
{
2(k−1)i{0, 1, . . . , 2n−(k−1)i − 1} for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m1}
2j{0, 1, . . . , Bi − 1} for i ∈ {m1 + 1, . . . ,m1 +m2 + 1}
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where now
Bi = ⌊2n−j/ρi−m1−1⌋ m1 = ⌊j/(k − 1)⌋
ρ = 2(n−j−1)/m2 m2 =
⌈
n− j
k − log2 2k
⌉
and again k = ⌊
√
1
2 log2N log2 log2N⌋. When making states in Si from states in Si−1 for i ∈
{1, . . . ,m1}, we cancel k − 1 bits with k states, so the condition of Lemma A.5 is satisfied. For
i = m1+1, we cancel j− (k−1)m1 = j− (k−1)⌊j/(k − 1)⌋ ≤ j− (k−1)[j/(k−1)−1] = k−1 bits,
so again the condition of Lemma A.5 is satisfied. For i ∈ {m1 + 2, . . . ,m1 +m2 + 1}, Lemma A.4
implies that the conditions of Lemma A.2 are satisfied provided 2n−j ≥ N0. (If 2n−j < N0 then we
only need to perform the firstm1+1 stages of the sieve, producing a state uniformly at random from
Sm1+1; in this case |Sm1+1| = O(1), so O(1) repetitions suffice to produce a copy of |ψ2j 〉.) Finally,
since (m1 +m2 + 1)k = (1 + o(1))n, the discussion following Lemma A.3 shows that Algorithm 5
takes time LN(
1
2 ,
√
2).
So far we have covered the case where the group is A = ZN with N either odd or a power of
2. Now consider the case of a general finite abelian group A = ZN1 × · · · × ZNt . By the Chinese
remainder theorem, we can assume without loss of generality that each Ni is either odd or a power
of 2. Consider what happens if we apply Algorithm 4 or Algorithm 6 to one component of a product
of cyclic groups. Suppose we combine k states of the form of Eqn. (ψ). For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let
xi ∈ ZN1 ×· · ·×ZNt denote the label of the ith state, with xi,j ∈ ZNj for j ∈ {1, . . . , t}. To address
the ℓth component of A, the combination procedure prepares a state
1√
2k
∑
y∈{0,1}k
exp

2πi k∑
i=1
t∑
j=1
yixi,jsj
Nj

 |y〉|h(∑ki=1 xi,ℓyi)〉
for some function h (a quotient in Algorithm 4 or a remainder in Algorithm 6). For j 6= ℓ, if xi,j = 0
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} then x′j =
∑k
i=1 xi,j(y
⋆
i − y⋆i ) = 0, so components that are initially zero remain
zero. Thus, if we can prepare states |ψx〉 with xℓ ∈R ZNℓ (for any desired ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , t}) and all
other components zero, we effectively reduce the problem to the cyclic case.
To prepare such states, we use a new combination procedure, Algorithm 7. Without loss of
generality, our goal is to zero out the first t− 1 components, leaving the last one uniformly random
from ZNt . Algorithm 7 is similar to Algorithm 4, viewing the first t − 1 components of the label
xi ∈ ZN1 × · · · × ZNt as the mixed-radix integer
µ(xi) :=
t−1∑
j=1
xi,j
j−1∏
j′=1
Nj′ .
Because we are merely trying to zero out certain components, we no longer require uniformity of
the states output by the sieve, which simplifies the procedure and its analysis.
Lemma A.6. Algorithm 7 runs in time 2k poly(logN) and succeeds with probability Ω(1) provided
B/B′ ≤ 2k/2k.
Proof. As in Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.5, the running time is dominated by the brute force calcula-
tion in Step 3 and the projection in Step 7, both of which can be performed in time 2k poly(logN).
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Algorithm 7 Combining non-cyclic states to reduce undesired components
Input: Parameters B,B′ and states |ψx1〉, . . . , |ψxk 〉 with known x1, . . . , xk ∈ ZN1 × · · · × ZNt satisfying
µ(xi) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B − 1} for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, with xi,t ∈R ZNt
Output: State |ψx′〉 with known x′ ∈ ZN1 ×· · ·×ZNt satisfying µ(x′) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B′−1}, with x′t ∈R ZNt
1: Introduce an ancilla register and compute
1√
2k
∑
y∈{0,1}k
exp
(
2πi
k∑
i=1
t∑
j=1
yixi,jsj
Nj
)
|y〉|⌊∑ki=1 µ(xi)yi/B′⌋〉
2: Measure the ancilla register, giving an outcome q and a state
1√
ν
ν∑
j=1
exp
(
2πi
k∑
i=1
t∑
j=1
yixi,jsj
Nj
)
|yj〉
where y1, . . . , yν 6= 0k are the k-bit strings such that ⌊∑ki=1 µ(xi)yji /B′⌋ = q
3: Compute y1, . . . , yν by brute force
4: if ν = 1 then
5: Abort
6: end if
7: Project onto span{|y1〉, |y2〉} or span{|y3〉, |y4〉} or . . . or span{|y2⌊ν/2⌋−1〉, |y2⌊ν/2⌋〉}, giving an outcome
span{|y⋆〉, |y ⋆〉}
8: Relabel |y⋆〉 7→ |0〉 and |y ⋆〉 7→ |1〉 where ∑ki=1 µ(xi)y ⋆i ≥ ∑ki=1 µ(xi)y⋆i WLOG, giving a state |ψx′〉
with x′j =
∑k
i=1 xi,j(y
⋆
i − y⋆i ) for each j ∈ {1, . . . , t}
We claim that the algorithm is correct if it reaches Step 8. Since
∑k
i=1 µ(xi)y
j
i = qB
′+ rj where
q is independent of j and 0 ≤ rj < B′, we have
µ(x′) =
t−1∑
j=1
x′j
j−1∏
j′=1
Nj′ =
t−1∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
xi,j(y
⋆
i − y⋆i )
j−1∏
j′=1
Nj′ =
k∑
i=1
µ(xi)(y
⋆
i − y⋆i ) = r
⋆− r⋆ < B′
as required. Since y⋆ 6= y ⋆and the xi,t are uniformly random, x′t =
∑k
i=1 xi,t(y
⋆
i − y⋆i ) is uniformly
random as required.
The projection in Step 7 fails with probability at most 1/3 + o(1). We claim the algorithm
reaches Step 7 with probability Ω(1). To show this, we need to upper bound the probability that
ν = 1. Call a value of q bad if ν = 1. Since 0 ≤∑ki=1 µ(xi)yi ≤ k(B − 1), there are at most kB/B′
possible values of q, and in particular, there can be at most kB/B′ bad values of q. Since the
probability of any particular bad q is 1/2k, the probability that q is bad is at most kB/B′2k ≤ 1/2.
This completes the proof.
To apply Algorithm 7 as the combination procedure for Algorithm 5, we require a straightforward
variant of Lemma A.4, as follows.
Lemma A.7. There is a constant N ′0 such that for all N > N
′
0, letting Bi = ⌊N/ρi⌋ where ρ =
N1/m and
k =
⌊√
1
2 log2N log2 log2N
⌋
m =
⌈
log2N
k − log2 4k
⌉
= Θ
(√
log2N
log2 log2N
)
,
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Algorithm 8 Abelian hidden shift problem
Input: Black box for the hidden shift problem in an abelian group A
Output: Hidden shift s
1: Write A = ZN1 × · · · × ZNt where each Ni is either odd or a power of 2
2: for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t} do
3: if Ni is odd then
4: for all j ∈ {0, . . . , ⌊log2Ni⌋} do
5: Apply Algorithm 5, first using Algorithm 7 to zero out all components except the ith one
and then using Algorithm 4 under the ZNi -automorphism x 7→ 2−jx to produce a copy of
|ψ(0,...,0,2j ,0,...,0)〉 (see the proof of Theorem A.1 for detailed parameters)
6: end for
7: else
8: Let Ni = 2
n
9: for all j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} do
10: Apply Algorithm 5, first using Algorithm 7 to zero out all components except the ith one, then
using Algorithm 6 to make states |ψ(0,...,0,x,0,...,0)〉 with 2j |x, and finally using Algorithm 4 to
produce a copy of |ψ(0,...,0,2j ,0,...,0)〉 (see the proof of Theorem A.1 for detailed parameters)
11: end for
12: end if
13: Apply Lemma A.1 with N = Ni to give si
14: end for
15: Output s = (s1, . . . , st)
we have B0 = N , Bm = 1, and Bi−1/Bi ≤ 2k/2k for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof. Clearly B0 = N , and the value of ρ is chosen so that Bm = 1.
We have Bm−1 ≤ N/ρm−1 = ρ, and since
ρ ≤ N
k−log2 4k
log2 N =
2k
4k
,
the claimed inequality holds for i = m.
For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1},
Bi−1
Bi
=
⌊N/ρi−1⌋
⌊N/ρi⌋ ≤
N/ρi−1
N/ρi − 1 =
ρ
1− ρi/N .
Since ρi/N ≤ ρm−1/N = 1/ρ, we have Bi−1/Bi ≤ ρ/(1− 1/ρ). Then using
ρ = NΘ(
√
log2 log2 N/ log2 N) = 2Θ(
√
log2 N log2 log2 N),
we have ρ ≥ 2 provided N > N ′0 for some constant N ′0, which implies Bi−1/Bi ≤ 2k/2k. This
completes the proof.
Combining these ideas, the overall procedure is presented in Algorithm 8.
Theorem A.1. Algorithm 8 runs in time L|A|(12 ,
√
2).
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Proof. In Step 1, if the structure of the group is not initially known, it can be determined in
polynomial time using [9]. Given the structure of the group, for each term ZN we can easily factor
N = 2nM where M is odd; then ZN ∼= Z2n × ZM , and we obtain a decomposition of the desired
form.
Now suppose without loss of generality that we are trying to determine st (i.e., i = t in Step 2).
The main contribution to the running time comes from the sieves in Step 5 (for Nt odd) and Step 10
(for Nt a power of 2).
First suppose that Nt is odd. It suffices to handle the case where j = 0, so we are making the
state |ψ(0,...,0,1)〉. Then we apply Algorithm 5 with
Si =
{
{x ∈ A : µ(x) < Bi} for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m1}
{x ∈ A : µ(x) = 0 and xt < Bi} for i ∈ {m1 + 1, . . . ,m2}
where
Bi =
{
⌊(N/Nt)/ρi1⌋ for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m1}
⌊Nt/ρi−m12 ⌋ for i ∈ {m1 + 1, . . . ,m1 +m2}
with
ρ1 = (N/Nt)
1/m1 m1 =
⌈
log2N/Nt
k − log2 4k
⌉
ρ2 = (Nt/2)
1/m2 m2 =
⌈
log2Nt/2
k − log2 2k
⌉
and k = ⌊
√
1
2 log2N log2 log2N⌋. We use Algorithm 7 as the combination procedure for the firstm1
stages of Algorithm 5. By Lemma A.7, the condition of Lemma A.6 is satisfied providedN/Nt > N
′
0;
otherwise we can produce a state with a label from Sm1 in only O(1) trials. Then we proceed to
apply Algorithm 4 as the combination procedure for the remaining m2 stages of Algorithm 5. By
Lemma A.4, the conditions of Lemma A.2 are satisfied provided Nt > N0; otherwise, producing
states with labels from Sm1 already suffices to produce the desired state with constant probability.
Since (m1 +m2)k = (1 + o(1)) log2N , Step 5 takes time L|A|(
1
2 ,
√
2) (see the discussion following
the proof of Lemma A.3).
Now suppose that Nt = 2
n is a power of 2. Then we apply Algorithm 5 with
Si =


{x ∈ A : µ(x) < Bi} for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m1}{
x ∈ A : µ(x) = 0 and xt ∈ 2(k−1)i{0, 1, . . . , 2n−(k−1)i}
}
for i ∈ {m1 + 1, . . . ,m1 +m2}{
x ∈ A : µ(x) = 0 and xt ∈ 2j{0, 1, . . . , Bi − 1}
} for i ∈ {m1 +m2 + 1, . . . ,
m1 +m2 +m3 + 1}
where
Bi =
{
⌊(N/Nt)/ρi1⌋ for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m1}
⌊2n−j/ρi−m1−m2−13 ⌋ for i ∈ {m1 +m2 + 1, . . . ,m1 +m2 +m3 + 1}
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with
ρ1 = (N/Nt)
1/m1 m1 =
⌈
log2N/Nt
k − log2 4k
⌉
m2 = ⌊j/(k − 1)⌋
ρ3 = 2
(n−j−1)/m3 m3 =
⌈
n− j − 1
k − log2 2k
⌉
and again k = ⌊
√
1
2 log2N log2 log2N⌋. We use Algorithm 7 as the combination procedure for the
firstm1 stages, Algorithm 6 for the nextm2+1 stages, and Algorithm 4 (on the n−j most significant
bits) for the final m3 stages. By Lemma A.7 and Lemma A.4, the conditions of Lemma A.6 and
Lemma A.2 are satisfied, respectively. Since we cancel at most k − 1 bits in each stage that uses
Algorithm 6, the conditions of Lemma A.5 are satisfied for the intermediate stages. Finally, since
(m1 +m2 +m3 + 1)k = (1 + o(1)) log2N , Step 10 takes time L|A|(
1
2 ,
√
2).
The loops in Step 2, Step 4, and Step 9 only introduce polynomial overhead. Step 13 takes
polynomial time and Step 15 is negligible. Thus the overall running time is L|A|(12 ,
√
2) as claimed.
